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Abstract
The fact that according to the celebrated Coase Theorem rational parties always try
to exploit all gains from trade is usually taken as an argument against the necessity of
government intervention through Pigouvian taxation in order to correct externalities.
However, we show that the hold-up problem, which occurs if non-veriﬁable invest-
ments have external eﬀects and parties cannot be prevented from always exploiting
ex post gains from trade through Coasean bargaining, may be solved by government
intervention. In this sense, the impossibility to rule out Coasean bargaining (after
investments are sunk) may in fact justify Pigouvian taxation.
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11 Introduction
A standard textbook argument known by every student of public economics goes as
follows.1 If the activity of party A has an uncompensated external eﬀect on party
B’s utility, then party A will not choose the socially eﬃcient activity level. Party
A can be made to internalize the externality by Pigouvian taxation. However, op-
ponents of government intervention typically argue that Pigouvian taxation is not
necessary. According to the celebrated Coase Theorem, rational parties always ex-
ploit all possible gains from trade, provided there are no frictions (speciﬁcally, if there
is symmetric information).2 They will hence write a contract that induces party A
to choose the eﬃcient activity level and divide the gains from trade by appropriate
transfer payments. Thus, if one does not make the assumption that the government
has better information than the parties themselves (which many economists consider
to be unrealistic), Coasean bargaining makes Pigouvian taxation unnecessary.
In contrast, in this paper we will argue that the very fact that (under frictionless
conditions) rational parties always engage in Coasean bargaining in order to exploit
all gains from trade, can indeed justify government intervention.
Speciﬁcally, we consider a hold-up problem, where a party can make a relationship-
speciﬁc investment ex ante, that enhances the gains from trade that can be realized
ex post.3 The investment is non-veriﬁable, i.e. the Coase Theorem clearly is inap-
plicable at the ex ante stage, before the investment is made. However, it is a standard
assumption in the literature on the hold-up problem that at the ex post stage, af-
ter the investment has been sunk, there are no more frictions (in particular, there is
1See e.g. Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995, p. 354) for a modern textbook treatment. See
also the seminal contributions by Pigou (1932) and Coase (1960).
2In a seminal paper, Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) have shown that bargaining can in general
n o ta l w a y sl e a dt oa ne xp o s te ﬃcient outcome if there is asymmetric information.
3For discussions of the hold-up problem, see e.g. Hart (1995) and Tirole (1999). See also Schmitz
(2001) for a non-technical survey of the literature.
2symmetric information).4 Hence, the parties always engage in Coasean bargaining in
order to exploit all ex post gains from trade. If investments have direct externalities
and if the investing party has not all bargaining power ex post, then the hold-up
problem cannot be solved contractually, precisely because Coasean bargaining at the
ex post stage cannot be prevented, as has ﬁr s tb e e ns h o w nb yM a s k i na n dM o o r e
(1999). The contribution of the present paper is to argue that, ironically, under these
circumstances Pigouvian taxation canh e l pt os o l v et h eh o l d - u pp r o b l e m .
In order to convey the intuition for our argument, consider the following simple
example, which is based on Maskin and Moore (1999). There are two risk-neutral
parties, a producer and a buyer. At date 1, the producer can decide whether or not to
exert eﬀort (i.e., invest) while producing one unit of an indivisible good, which can be
traded with the buyer at date 2. If the producer does not exert eﬀort at date 1,t h e
buyer’s willingness-to-pay for the good is vl. If the producer exerts eﬀort at a personal
disutility cost c>0, then the buyer’s valuation is vh, where vh >v l > 0. The producer
has no further costs. Notice that the producer’s eﬀort has a direct externality on the
buyer’s valuation v ∈ {vl,v h}. If the producer were not compensated, she would never
exert eﬀort. However, exerting eﬀort is socially eﬃcient provided that vh − vl >c ,
which we assume in what follows.
Let eﬀort (and hence the buyer’s valuation) be observable by the two parties,
but unveriﬁable to outsiders such as the courts. Even though eﬀort is thus non-
contractible, it might be possible for the parties to ex ante write a contract which
induces the producer to invest by giving the buyer an option to buy the good at date
2, with a strike price of vh. The idea is that the buyer would only exercise the option
if the producer had exerted eﬀort, and the producer would exert eﬀort because she
would then get the total surplus vh − c. Yet, there is a problem. Suppose that the
4The standard assumption that there is frictionless ex post bargaining has recently been sharply
criticized by Williamson (2000, 2002), who considers this point to be a crucial diﬀerence between
the so-called property rights approach (which builds on the hold-up problem, see Hart, 1995) and
transaction costs economics. See Schmitz (2006) for a ﬁrst attempt to model asymmetric information
as a source of transaction costs at the ex post stage.
3producer had exerted eﬀort, so that the buyer’s valuation is vh. If the buyer exercises
the option, he receives zero. But if he does not exercise, there would still remain
gains from trade to be exploited, since vh > 0. Thus, in accordance with the Coase
Theorem, the parties would start to bargain. Let the outcome of the negotiations
be given by the Nash bargaining solution, so that each party would get 1
2vh at date
2. If the producer had not exerted eﬀort, a similar reasoning shows that each party
would get 1
2vl. Hence, the producer would not exert eﬀort if 1
2 (vh − vl) <c .In fact,
Maskin and Moore (1999) prove that there is no ex ante contract the parties could
write which induces eﬀort if this inequality holds. This is the hold-up problem in its
most severe form.
We will now show that the hold-up problem, which is caused by the direct exter-
nality of the producer’s eﬀort and the fact that parties always exploit all gains from
trade (which makes threats of ex post ineﬃcient outcomes incredible), can in fact be
solved by government intervention. Notice that we do not assume that the government
can observe otherwise non-veriﬁable information. Hence, we do not condition the tax
on the producer’s eﬀort or the buyer’s true valuation.5 Instead, consider the follow-
ing tax scheme. The buyer must pay t(vh − z) to the government, where t ∈ (0,1)
denotes the tax rate. What is important here is that any payment z that the buyer
makes to the producer is deductible;6 i.e., the buyer’s net payoﬀ is xv−tvh−(1−t)z,
where x ∈ {0,1} denotes the parties’ trade decision. Assume that the parties have
written no contract ex ante, which will turn out to be optimal. Then they will always
negotiate at date 2.W ec o n t i n u et oa s s u m et h a tt h eo u t c o m eo ft h en e g o t i a t i o n si s
5Since the producer’s eﬀort has a positive externality, a naive Pigouvian solution would be to
directly subsidize eﬀort. This is not feasible because eﬀort is unveriﬁable, so that a solution must be
sought which circumvents this problem.
6Transfer payments are usually assumed to be veriﬁable in the hold-up literature. Of course,
whenever a taxpayer can deduct expenditures, there is a danger of fraudulent tax evasion (the buyer
might overstate the true expenses, perhaps colluding with the seller). For simplicity, we assume that
this could be detected by auditing and is deterred by suﬃciently high penalties. (Our ﬁndings hold
qualitatively as long as tax audits are not completely ineﬀective.)
4given by the Nash bargaining solution. The producer’s and the buyer’s threatpoint
payoﬀs (what they get if negotiations fail) are 0 and −tvh, respectively. Thus, the
parties will always agree to trade (x =1 )a n dc h o o s et h ep a y m e n tt h a tm a x i m i z e st h e





Anticipating the bargaining outcome, the producer will exert eﬀort if and only if
1
2(1 − t)
(vh − vl) ≥ c.
Therefore, if t = 1
2, the producer will invest whenever it is socially eﬃcient to do so
and thus the hold-up problem has been solved.8
It will turn out that our argument can be generalized considerably. In particular,
eﬀort and valuation do not have to be binary variables, the relationship between eﬀort
and valuation does not have to be deterministic, and the parties’ bargaining powers
do not have to be equal. We will also discuss extensions of our set-up, where a simple
tax-subsidy scheme can alleviate the hold-up problem, even if the government does
not know the parties’ bargaining powers, or if the seller may incur further costs at
the ex post stage, or if there are two-sided investments. In each case, even though
the government cannot change the parties’ bargaining powers, taxation can change
the set of feasible ex post outcomes, so that the outcome of ex post bargaining can
be inﬂuenced by the government.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper which argues that the hold-up
problem, which is caused by unveriﬁable investments with direct externalities and,
ironically, by the fact that (at the ex post stage) Coasean bargaining always exploits
all gains from trade, can be solved by a simple form of Pigouvian taxation.
7For an exposition of the Nash product and the Nash bargaining solution, see e.g. Muthoo (1999).
It should be noted that even though Nash bargaining is a standard assumption in the contract
theoretic literature, it might be more diﬃcult to provide a strategic justiﬁcation in a framework
without commitment (cf. Muthoo, 1990).
8Note that in equilibrium the tax revenue is zero.
5The hold-up problem has played a prominent role in recent contract-theoretic
research. In particular, Maskin and Moore (1999), Che and Hausch (1999), and Segal
and Whinston (2002) have shown that there are no contractual arrangements that
induce eﬃcient investments in the presence of direct externalities, provided that the
parties cannot commit not to exploit future gains from trade and each party receives
a positive fraction of the renegotiation surplus. In the absence of direct externalities,
the parties can solve the hold-up problem by writing appropriate contracts, as has
been demonstrated by Edlin and Reichelstein (1996).9 Hence, the standard argument
that it is the presence of externalities which calls for intervention by the government
is true in the present context. Moreover, the fact that in accordance with the Coase
Theorem the parties will always exhaust any ex post gains from trade does not solve
the hold-up problem, instead it causes the hold-up problem. In this sense, our paper
indeed shows that the very Coase Theorem can justify government interventions that
are usually associated with Pigou.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we show that our
argument outlined above can be generalized to a framework with uncertainty where
eﬀort and valuation are continuous variables. In section 3, we discuss heterogenous
bargaining powers, the role of further costs of the producer, and two-sided investments.
While it may no longer achieve the ﬁr s tb e s t ,i tt u r n so u tt h a to u rs i m p l et a x a t i o n
scheme can still implement signiﬁcant welfare improvements. Concluding remarks
follow in section 4. Finally, some technical details have been relegated to the appendix.
9See also Rogerson (1992) and Hermalin and Katz (1993), who show that the ﬁr s tb e s tc a nb e
achieved if the parties can commit not to exploit future gains from trade, even in the presence
of private information. Schmitz (2002a) shows that their results can be extended to the case in
which renegotiation is possible, provided that there are no direct externalities. In general, the ﬁrst
best cannot be attained in the presence of private information and direct externalities (see Schmitz,
2002b). For the case of symmetric information, see also Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (1994),
Chung (1991), Nöldeke and Schmidt (1995), and De Fraja (1999), who derive ﬁr s tb e s tr e s u l t sf o r
alternative forms of renegotiation.
62 The model
Consider two risk-neutral parties, a producer A and a buyer B. At date 0, the parties
can write a contract. At date 1, the producer chooses an unobservable relationship-
speciﬁce ﬀort level e ≥ 0. Her personal eﬀort costs are given by the increasing
and convex function c(e), which satisﬁes the usual Inada conditions c0(0) = 0 and
lime→∞ c0(e)=∞. At date 2, the buyer’s gains from trade v ≥ 0, which stochastically
depend on e, are realized.10 At date 3, trade can occur and payments can be made.
If the contract does not already lead to trade, the parties will negotiate according to
the generalized Nash bargaining solution, where the producer’s bargaining power is
given by α ∈ (0,1).
The buyer’s valuation v ∈ [vl,v h] is observable by the two parties, but unveriﬁable
to outsiders. Let the buyer’s valuation be distributed according to the cumulative dis-
tribution function F(v|e). We assume that the producer’s eﬀort increases the buyer’s
valuation in the sense of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance, so that Fe(v|e) < 0. More-
over, we assume that Fee(v|e) > 0, so that the expected value E[v|e] is concave in e.
T h ep r o b a b i l i t yo ft r a d ei sd e n o t e db yx ∈ [0,1]. In a ﬁrst-best world, trade would
always occur (xFB =1 ), and the eﬀort level would be e = eFB, where
e
FB =a r gm a xE[v|e] − c(e) (1)
maximizes the expected social surplus. We say that the hold-up problem is solved if
the parties are induced to make these ﬁrst-best decisions.
Let t ∈ (0,1) denote the tax rate and suppose that the buyer must pay t · (¯ v − z)
to the government; i.e., any payment z that he makes to the producer is deductible.
The tax base ¯ v can be an arbitrary constant (see the discussion at the end of this
10One can imagine that the producer’s eﬀort inﬂuences the quality of the speciﬁcg o o dt ob e
traded, which also depends on random events. In this section we assume that the good has only
value for the buyer and the producer incurs no further (opportunity) costs at date 3.
7section). Hence, the parties’ payoﬀs are as follows:
uA = z − c(e)
uB = xv − t¯ v − (1 − t)z
In general, a contract between the two parties can specify a trade decision and a
transfer payment as a function of veriﬁable messages sent after the state of the world
has been realized.11 Thus, a contract is given by [X(sA,s B),Z(sA,s B)],w h e r esA and
sB denote A’s and B’s reporting strategies, that can depend on the true valuation v.
It is straightforward to see that the parties would write a contract solving the hold-up
problem if ex post negotiations were impossible.12 However, as we have discussed
in the introduction, a contract may be valueless when we take into consideration
that the parties will always exploit any remaining gains from trade through Coasean
bargaining. Since ex post eﬃciency (x =1 ) is thus achieved independently of any ex
ante contract, the only use of such a contract could be to improve eﬀort incentives.
Proposition 1 a) Let ˜ e denote the eﬀort level that the producer chooses in the absence
of an ex ante contract. Then an eﬀort level ˆ e can be contractually induced if and only
if ˆ e ∈ [0, ˜ e].
b) The parties write no contract at date 0, i.e. [X,Z] ≡ [0,0].






Proof. See the appendix.
11An example for such a contract is the option contract mentioned in the introduction. In the
case of the option contract, only the buyer sends a message (namely, whether or not he exercises the
option).
12For example, consider the following contract. After v has been realized, the seller and the buyer
both report a value. If the reports match, trade occurs, and the buyer pays the reported value.
Otherwise, no trade occurs. It is an equilibrium that both parties tell the truth and the seller
invests eFB. More sophisticated mechanisms in order to get rid of ineﬃcient equilibria can easily be
constructed following Moore (1992).
8Intuitively, in the absence of a contract the producer will receive a fraction of the
buyer’s realized valuation through Coasean bargaining at date 3. Thus, she has at least
some incentive to exert eﬀort at date 1 in order to increase the buyer’s valuation. On
the other hand, if the contract simply prescribed trade at an ex ante speciﬁed price,
ex post eﬃciency would be achieved without further bargaining at date 3, but the
producer had no incentives to exert eﬀort, because this would only beneﬁt the buyer.
The proof of Proposition 1a) shows that even more sophisticated contracts can only
reduce the incentives to exert eﬀort when ex post ineﬃciencies are always negotiated
away at date 3. This result is in the spirit of Che and Hausch (1999) and Segal and
Whinston (2002) who argue that parties cannot solve the hold-up problem by writing
contracts, because this could only decrease eﬀort further below the ﬁrst-best level.
Yet, our model diﬀers from their models (which do not consider taxation), because
here utility is not transferable on a 1:1 basis from one party to the other party.13 In
particular, in our framework the no-contract eﬀort level ˜ e may well be above the ﬁrst-
best level eFB.14 In this case, the parties could in principle write a contract inducing
e = eFB. However, Proposition 1b) says that such a contract can never be proﬁtable
for both parties simultaneously and thus will never be written.
Speciﬁcally, assume that the parties write no ex ante contract, so that trade will
only occur through ex post bargaining. Since [X,Z] ≡ [0,0], party A’s and party
B’s threatpoint payoﬀsa td a t e3 (i.e., after the eﬀort costs c(e) are sunk) are given
by 0 and −t¯ v, respectively. Thus, the payment according to the generalized Nash
bargaining solution is characterized by
z =a r gm a xz
α (v − (1 − t)z)
1−α ,
13In general, the irrelevance of contracting might no longer hold if utilities are non-transferable;
see Bensaid and Gary-Bobo (1993) for a related point in a diﬀerent setting.
14It should be noted that overinvestments are also possible in the model of Muthoo (1998), yet for
diﬀerent reasons (his focus is on the communication technology in outside option bargaining).
9i.e. by z = α








The ﬁrst-best eﬀort level can be induced by an appropriate tax rate, as is stated in
the following result.
Corollary 1 The government can solve the hold-up problem by choosing the tax rate
t =1− α.
Proof. This follows immediately from the fact that trade always occurs, i.e. ex
post eﬃciency is achieved through negotiations at date 3, and the producer chooses
e in order to maximize (2), which coincides with the deﬁnition of eFB given in (1) if
α
1−t =1 .
In contrast, ˜ e is smaller (larger) than eFB whenever the tax rate t is smaller (larger)
than 1 − α. A strictly positive tax rate is thus necessary in order to solve the hold-
up problem whenever the buyer has some bargaining power.15 While we follow the
literature in assuming that the parties’ bargaining powers cannot be changed, the
government can inﬂuence the bargaining outcome (and hence the investment incen-
tives) by taxation, the important eﬀect of which is to change the slope of the Pareto
frontier that is the boundary of the parties’ feasible payoﬀ p a i r sa td a t e3 .
Note that the result that in the absence of an ex ante contract the ﬁr s tb e s tw i l l
be achieved in case of t =1− α does not depend on the particular way in which the
producer’s eﬀort level inﬂuences the buyer’s valuation.16
Finally, it should also be noted that it is not important for our result how the
tax base ¯ v is chosen, as long as it is exogenously given, because obviously it has no
inﬂuence on the incentives. For example, the government could set ¯ v = E[v|eFB], so
15Of course, if the producer had all bargaining power (α =1 ), the ﬁr s tb e s tw o u l db ea c h i e v e d
without taxation, since there would be no hold-up problem in the ﬁrst place.
16For example, the producer’s eﬀort could be a multidimensional variable. What is important is
that the right hand side of (1) coincides with (2) for t =1− α.
10that the expected tax revenue would be zero in equilibrium. What is important for
the incentives is the fact that the buyer can deduct his payment to the producer from
his tax base (i.e., there is a tax subsidy). We might also set ¯ v =0 ,s ot h a ttz would
simply be a subsidy,17 if the government can use other funds to ﬁnance the subsidy.
For example, it might impose a lump sum tax on the seller, such that in equilibrium
the expected tax revenue is zero. However, it should be mentioned that we cannot
impose government budget balance oﬀ the equilibrium path (provided there are no
third parties who could be taxed), because then the subsidy to the buyer would no
longer be ﬁnanced by a lump sum tax. Rational parties would “see through” the
budget constraint and thus we would have neutrality of the tax-subsidy scheme.18
3 Discussion
3.1 Bargaining powers
It is a standard assumption in the literature on the hold-up problem to model nego-
tiations with the regular Nash bargaining solution, i.e. with α = 1
2.19 In this case, the
solution to the hold-up problem given in section 2 is remarkably simple to implement.
A tax rate of 50% is suﬃcient, independent of the characteristics of the particular
hold-up problem under consideration, such as the eﬀort cost function or the distribu-
tion function of the valuations. However, if the parties’ bargaining powers diﬀer, the
solution oﬀered in the previous section only implements the ﬁr s tb e s ti ft =1− α.
One might argue that the government does not know the precise bargaining powers
of any two parties that are in the hold-up dilemma. Moreover, one might (not just
17In this case, the buyer would neither pay a tax nor receive a subsidy if the parties did not agree
on trade (of course, this never happens in equilibrium).
18To see this point formally, set τ = t in equation (3) in section 3.3 below. We would like to thank
an anonymous referee for pointing out this instance of Ricardian equivalence.
19See e.g. Hart (1995), Aghion and Tirole (1994), Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), Tirole (1999),
or Roider (2004).
11in our model, but quite generally) doubt whether a tax system can be suﬃciently
ﬁne-tuned in order to solve speciﬁc externality problems when there are heterogenous
parties facing such problems. Therefore, it might be interesting to observe that even
if the government only knows the distribution of the bargaining powers and cannot
ﬁne-tune the tax rate, a signiﬁcant welfare improvement can be achieved by simply
using a rule-of-thumb tax scheme.
Speciﬁcally, suppose that the bargaining power α is uniformly distributed on the
unit interval, but the government can only set one tax rate t independent of α.
For simplicity, assume that there is a deterministic relationship between the pro-
ducer’s eﬀort and the buyer’s valuation, v =
√
e. Moreover, let c(e)=e, so that
the total surplus generated by the parties is
√
e − e. Given tax rate t, the producer
chooses ˜ e =a r gm a x α
1−t
√
e − e. Hence, ˜ e = α2











(1−t)2, which is maximized by t = 1
3. The resulting surplus
is 3
16, while the ﬁrst best surplus is 1
4 and the second best surplus without taxation
is 1
6. In other words, in this example even an easily implementable rule-of-thumb tax
scheme would lead to a realization of 75% of the ﬁrst best surplus, while in the absence
of taxation only 66% would be realized due to the hold-up problem.
3.2 Further costs
In section 2 we considered a model in which trade was always eﬃcient. While this
is done in many contributions to the literature on the hold-up problem,20 one can
also consider the additional problem that arises when trade is only ex post eﬃcient
in some states of the world. Therefore, let us now assume that the producer incurs
further costs k if and only if she trades with the buyer, so that the payoﬀsa r eg i v e n
20See e.g. Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1992), Aghion and Tirole (1994), Hart (1995), Hart, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1997), Nöldeke and Schmidt (1998), Tirole (1999), or Gul (2001).
12by
uA = z − xk − c(e),
uB = xv − t¯ v − (1 − t)z.
Now trade is eﬃcient whenever v−k ≥ 0, and the ﬁrst best eﬀort level is characterized
by
e
FB =a r gm a xE[max{v − k,0}|e] − c(e).
For simplicity, assume that the parties negotiate ex post according to the regular Nash
bargaining solution. The Nash product (z − xk)(xv − (1 − t)z) is now maximized by
z = x
v+(1−t)k
2(1−t) , so that the parties choose x =1whenever v − (1 − t)k ≥ 0. Hence,
setting t>0 means that the parties will want to trade too often at date 3. If there is no
uncertainty, so that the buyer’s valuation depends deterministically on the producer’s
eﬀort by a function v = ˇ v(e), this is no problem. In this case, the government could
simply set t = 1
2 if ˇ v(eFB) ≥ k, and t =0otherwise.21 However, in the presence
of uncertainty there is now a trade-oﬀ between improving the producer’s investment
incentives and inducing the ex post eﬃcient trade decision. The producer chooses














so that in general the ﬁrst best will not be achieved. Yet, Pigouvian taxation can still
generate signiﬁcant welfare improvements.
As an illustration, let e ∈ {0,1} and let v be distributed on the unit interval





vi f e =0 ,
v2 if e =1 .
Assume that c(0) = 0,c (1) = 1
20, and k = 1
2. It is easy to check that the ﬁrst




20 ≈ .158. The producer’s payoﬀ is
21Notice that the government can calculate ˇ v(eFB), even though it cannot observe the actually


















wise. Straightforward calculations show that the smallest tax rate which induces the
producer to exert eﬀort is given by t ≈ .074. I ft h eg o v e r n m e n ts e t st h i st a xr a t e ,








20 ≈ .157, while it would be .125 without
taxation. Thus, without taxation less than 79% of the expected ﬁrst-best surplus
could be realized, while more than 99% are realized with taxation.
3.3 Two-sided investments
Finally, let us discuss an extension of the basic model in which both parties can under-
take cooperative investments that can enhance the gains from trade. In the previous
subsection, we assumed that the producer’s costs k which are incurred whenever trade
takes place were exogenously given. However, it might also be the case that the buyer
can exert eﬀort in order to reduce these costs. Therefore, let the parties’ payoﬀsn o w
be given by
uA =( 1 − τ)z − xk − cA(eA),
uB = xv − t¯ v − (1 − t)z − cB(eB),
where ei denotes party i’s eﬀort, ci is party i’s cost function, and the producer pays
at a xτz.22 The valuation v ∈ [vl,v h] is still distributed according to the distribution
function F(v|eA),w h i l et h ec o s t sk ∈ [kl,k h] are distributed according to a distribution
function G(k|eB).T h eﬁrst-best outcome is again characterized by xFB =1whenever
v − k ≥ 0 and the ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels are given by eFB
A =a r g m a x E[max{v −
k,0}|eA,e FB
B ] − cA(eA) and eFB
B =a r gm a xE[max{v − k,0}|eFB
A ,e B] − cB(eB).
For simplicity, assume again that the parties negotiate ex post according to the
regular Nash bargaining solution. The Nash product ((1 − τ)z − xk)(xv − (1 − t)z)
22In analogy to the discussion at the end of section 2, the producer’s tax could be given back as
a lump sum payment T, such that in equilibrium the tax revenue is zero. Since a constant payment
does not alter the incentives, for simplicity we do not introduce the additional notation here. In the
following discussion, the total surplus includes the tax revenue.
14is now maximized by z = x
v(1−τ)+k(1−t)
2(1−t)(1−τ) and the parties choose x =1whenever
(1 − τ)v − (1 − t)k ≥ 0. The parties’ eﬀort levels are thus given by




























In general, there is now an additional trade-oﬀ between improving party B’s in-
vestment incentives (i.e., making τ larger than t) and improving party A’s investment
incentives. With regard to this trade-oﬀ,w h e t h e ro rn o tτ should be larger than t
depends on the relative importance of the parties’ investment decisions.23




B.T h e ﬁrst-best surplus is 9/4,
where eFB
A =1 /2 and eFB
B =4 . Given tax rates t and τ, the producer’s eﬀort is
now ˜ eA = 1
4
1−τ
1−t, while the buyer’s eﬀort is ˜ eB =2 1−t
1−τ. In the absence of taxation,
the surplus thus is 27/16. In contrast, if τ = .49 and t =0(since here the buyer’s
investment is more important), the surplus is 2.11. In other words, without taxation
only 75% of the ﬁrst-best surplus would be realized due to the hold-up problem, while
more than 93% can be realized with taxation.
4C o n c l u s i o n
It is true that externalities per se do not automatically make intervention by the
government through Pigouvian taxation necessary in order to maximize the social
surplus. If the activities that have external eﬀects are veriﬁable, the parties can
negotiate contracts which induce an internalization of the externalities, as is suggested
by the Coase Theorem. But if investments with direct externalities are unveriﬁable,
contractual arrangements may have no value. Indeed, the very reason that contracts
23Note that there is an analogy to the incomplete contracting literature, where hold-up problems
can be mitigated by assigning ownership rights (see Hart, 1995). In this literature, who should be
the owner depends on whose investment decisions are relatively more important.
15fail to induce ﬁrst-best behavior is the fact that (after the investments have been
sunk) private parties will always exhaust all ex post gains from trade through Coasean
bargaining. A simple form of Pigouvian taxation can solve or at least alleviate the
resulting hold-up problem.
Our analysis illustrates that removing tax subsidies, which is a prominent item
on the political agenda of many European countries, may well have negative welfare
consequences, because it might aggravate hold-up problems. More generally, our
paper emphasizes that if hold-up problems do have the importance that is suggested
by recent contributions in the contract theoretic literature, then the possibility to
reduce the welfare losses caused by hold-up problems with the help of government
intervention should not be completely neglected.
16Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
Suppose that the parties have written a contract [X(sA,s B),Z(sA,s B)] at date 0. At
date 3, after the parties A and B have chosen their strategies sA and sB, respectively,
the parties will negotiate in order to exploit the remaining gains from trade whenever
X(sA,s B) < 1. According to the generalized Nash bargaining solution, the outcome
of the negotiations can be characterized by maximizing the Nash product
(ζ − Z(sA,s B))
α ((1 − X(sA,s B))v − (1 − t)(ζ − Z(sA,s B)))
1−α ,
where we have used the fact that the parties’ threatpoint payoﬀsa r eg i v e nb yZ(sA,s B)
and X(sA,s B)v − (1 − t)Z(sA,s B) − t¯ v, respectively. Hence, the payment that the
producer ultimately receives is given by ζ = Z(sA,s B)+
1−X(sA,sB)
1−t αv. The parties’
date 3 payoﬀsa r et h u sg i v e nb y
ωA(sA,s B,v)=Z(sA,s B)+
1 − X(sA,s B)
1 − t
αv, (4)
ωB(sA,s B,v)=v − (1 − t)Z(sA,s B) − t¯ v − (1 − X(sA,s B))αv
= v − t¯ v − (1 − t)ωA(sA,s B,v). (5)
In equilibrium, the producer will choose sA(v) such that for all (v,˜ v) ∈ [vl,v h]2
ωA(sA(v),s B(v),v) ≥ ωA(sA(˜ v),s B(v),v),
and the buyer will analogously choose sB(v) such that for all (v,˜ v) ∈ [vl,v h]2
v − t¯ v − (1 − t)ωA(sA(v),s B(v),v) ≥ v − t¯ v − (1 − t)ωA(sA(v),s B(˜ v),v),
which is equivalent to
ωA(sA(v),s B(˜ v),v) ≥ ωA(sA(v),s B(v),v).
Hence, we must have
ωA(sA(˜ v),s B(v),v) ≤ ωA(sA(v),s B(v),v) ≤ ωA(sA(v),s B(˜ v),v) (6)
17if v is the buyer’s true valuation, and analogously
ωA(sA(v),s B(˜ v), ˜ v) ≤ ωA(sA(˜ v),s B(˜ v), ˜ v) ≤ ωA(sA(˜ v),s B(v),˜ v) (7)
if ˜ v is the buyer’s true valuation. The two chains of inequalities (6) and (7) imply
together with (4) and (5) that
α
1 − t
(1 − X(sA(v),s B(˜ v)))(˜ v − v)
= ωA(sA(v),s B(˜ v), ˜ v) − ωA(sA(v),s B(˜ v),v)
≤ ωA(sA(˜ v),s B(˜ v), ˜ v) − ωA(sA(v),s B(v),v)




(1 − X(sA(˜ v),s B(v)))(˜ v − v).






(1 − X(sA(v),s B(v))) (8)
almost everywhere. Now consider the producer’s incentives to exert eﬀort at date 1.

























(1 − X(sA(v),s B(v)))Fe(v|e)dv,
where the second line follows from integration by parts and the last line follows from
(8).
Given the contract [X(sA,s B),Z(sA,s B)], the producer will hence choose e =ˆ e,






(1 − X(sA(v),s B(v)))Fe(v|ˆ e)dv = c
0(ˆ e).






Fe(v|˜ e)dv = c
0(˜ e).
It is straightforward to see that any X 6=0can only make ˆ e smaller than ˜ e. Moreover,
any eﬀort level e ∈ [0,˜ e] can obviously be induced by a contract that speciﬁes a
suitable ﬁxed trade level X ∈ [0,1], which completes the proof of part a).
Consider a contract [X(sA,s B),Z(sA,s B)] that induces investment ˆ e and let ˆ x(v) ≡
X(sA(v),s B(v)), ˆ z(v) ≡ Z(sA(v),s B(v)). The parties will agree on such a contract















and simultaneously the buyer can be made better oﬀ,
E [v − t¯ v − (1 − t)ˆ z(v) − (1 − ˆ x(v))αv|ˆ e] − (1 − t)z0 ≥ E [(1 − α)v − t¯ v|˜ e].







− c(˜ e) − E
·
ˆ z(v)+








(E [v − t¯ v − (1 − t)ˆ z(v) − (1 − ˆ x(v))αv|ˆ e] − E [(1 − α)v − t¯ v|˜ e])













− c(ˆ e). (9)





− c(e). Note that ˜ e<ˇ e due to α<1 and concavity.
Moreover, we know from part a) that for any contract we have ˆ e ≤ ˜ e. Hence, there
exists no contract so that (9) holds with strict inequality, which proves part b) of the
proposition. Part c) then follows immediately. With regard to the discussion following
t h ep r o p o s i t i o n ,n o t et h a tt h em a rginal revenue from exerting eﬀort in the ﬁrst-best
























Hence, ˜ e is smaller (larger) than eFB whenever α
1−t is smaller (larger) than 1.
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